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CHAPTER 7 
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, THE WORLD BANK, 
AND NONBINDING INSTRUMENTS 
by David A. Wirth 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses nonbinding instruments in operational 
aspects of economic assistance policies and programs, using the 
World Bank as an example. To that end, the discussion will (1) 
provide a structure for legal analysis of the role of nonbinding 
instruments in operational aspects of economic assistance programs; 
(2) frame issues for further investigation and research; (3) suggest 
opportunities for more intensive utilization of nonbinding 
instruments in economic assistance programs than has been the case 
in the past; and (4) stimulate further consideration of this topic in 
the context of the role of nonbinding international instruments more 
generally. 
The chapter first addresses the scope of the issue, in particular 
by reference to the kinds of institutions whose operations might be 
amenable to this analysis. Second, the wide variety of nonbinding 
instruments is surveyed with an eye to their potential utility in 
economic assistance programs. Third, the World Bank is selected and 
analyzed as a concrete case that raises two discrete aspects of the 
larger issue: (1) the application of internal standards; and (2) the 
potential utility of nonbinding guidelines and principles that 
originate outside the institution. The chapter concludes with 
observations concerning the potential for expanding the use of 
nonbinding instruments in the work of relevant institutions and 
recommendations for further research. It should be emphasized that 
it is based on an initial investigation whose principal purpose has 
been to identify productive areas for further inquiry. Due to the 
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nature of the subject matter, some of the observations are based on 
information of a preliminary, anecdotal character. 
Scope 
A large variety of organizations are engaged in providing 
economic assistance, broadly defined. Indeed, the scope of the 
institutions and programs of potential interest is so expansive that 
no single term in common use, such as "development assistance," 
encompasses them all. For the purposes of this research on the 
application or utilization of nonbinding instrumen~, the institutions 
of interest are those that provide financial assistance whose source 
is public monies to promote economic development abroad. Although 
not widely employed, for want of a better term one might speak of 
"economic assistance" provided through the operational activities of 
the following institutions: 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), the International Development 
Association (IDA), and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) (collectively, the "World Bank group"); 
the regional development banks, including the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), the African 
Development Bank (AIDB), the Asian Development Bank 
(AsDB), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD); 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF); 
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP); 
the European Investment Bank (EIB); and 
the United States Agency for International Development 
(U.S.A.I.D.). 
These institutions exhibit a wide variety of operational approaches 
to the commonly shared mission of promoting economic development 
abroad, with a particular emphasis on the developing world. Some, 
such as U.S.A.I.D., are bilateral in nature, creatures of national 
governments and parliaments. Others, such as the World Bank 
group, the regional banks, UNDP and the IMF, are multilateral, 
intergovernmental institutions accountable to a multiplicity of 
states. Among multilateral bodies, the World Bank group and the 
IMF operate pursuant to weighted voting rules that emphasize the 
influence of donor country governments. By contrast, recipient 
country governments have a stronger voice at UNDP, as they do in 
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the United Nations system generally. The World Bank group and the 
regional banks award loans, whereas UNDP and U.S.A.I.D. provide 
assistance in the form of grants. The IBRD and IDA lend exclusively 
to governments and the IFC only to private borrowers; the EBRD, as 
mandated in its charter, engages in both sovereign and private sector 
lending. The World Bank group and the IMF make extensive use of 
reciprocal promises from recipients, or "conditionality," with respect 
to the use of funds by recipients, whereas UNDP customarily does 
not. UNDP's technical assistance grant program supports clearly 
delineated projects, whereas the IMF's stabilization lending is 
intended to address short-term macroeconomic imbalances. The 
World Bank not only supports specific projects, but also undertakes 
adjustment lending that targets medium-term policy adjustments 
and sector lending that can serve as a vehicle to address larger 
institutional reforms and capacity, as, for example, in the area of a 
country's energy policies. 
Despite these significant differences in institutional structure 
and function, from the point of view of the instant discussion these 
entities share one crucial feature: Each is engaged in the transfer of 
public money to support or encourage activities overseas. This 
provides a relatively obvious juncture at which nonbinding 
instruments might apply. Another common feature concerns the 
potential or actual divergence between the policies of donors and the 
desires of recipients. In the case of multilateral institutions, such as 
those comprising the World Bank group, the policy of the 
intergovernmental organization, as distinct from those of either its 
donor or recipient country members, is another mediating 
consideration. 
As a preliminary analysis purposely limited in scope, this 
chapter addresses only those "windows" of the World Bank group 
that engage in sovereign lending operations: the IBRD and IDA, 
which, unless the context indicates otherwise, will be referred to in 
the remainder of this paper collectively as the "World Bank." The 
reasons for this focus are several. For one, institutional structures, 
operational missions, and even terminology vary widely among the 
entities enumerated above. For the sake of clarity, it is helpful to 
consider only one institutional setting. Further research that might 
be appropriate for other institutions can then be identified through 
a process of extrapolation by induction from this particular concrete 
case. Second, as the result of the relatively intense scrutiny by 
governments and the public of its performance in the fields of 
environment, human rights and social welfare over the past decade 
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or more, the Bank in response has adopted a series of reasonably 
concrete policies and instituted a number of specific institutional 
features, such as the recently-created Inspection Panel. Perhaps not 
coincidentally, those junctures create relatively frequent 
opportunities to apply nonbinding instruments. As such, the World 
Bank is a relatively highly developed structural environment that 
can serve as a paradigm for further research to examine the 
implementation and application of non.binding instruments. 
Moreover, both the Bank's professional staff and outside observers 
of the institution generally have greater institutional experience in 
implementing the subject matter addressed by the bulk of these 
nonbinding instruments than do at least some of the other entities 
enumerated above. 
Range and Utility of Nonbinding Instruments 
Nonbinding instruments have been extensively treated in the 
literature, and only the most salient features will be summarized 
here. Perhaps the most familiar nonbinding vehicles are those which, 
like binding international agreements, are adopted by states and 
addressed to states. However, the procedural posture and mode of 
adoption of nonbinding or "soft" instruments is quite wide-ranging, 
and probably considerably broader than that of the binding or "hard" 
law arising from international agreements. For instance, nonbinding 
instruments need not necessarily have been adopted or approved by 
representatives of governments.1 Nonbinding instruments may also 
be addressed to private parties, as opposed to governments. 2 There 
are even examples of nonbinding instruments that have been both 
adopted by and addressed to private entities. 3 To that extent, 
nonbinding instruments may be more sensitive indicators of recent 
developments that afford non-state actors a stronger voice in 
international affairs than do most binding international agreements. 
Unlike an international agreement, a nonbinding instrument by its 
very nature ordinarily does not have identifiable parties that are 
bound by its terms. Nor are there widely accepted procedures for the 
process by which such instruments are adopted and enter into force. 
And, of course, a nonbinding instrument by definition lacks objective 
indicia of an intent to be bound. 
Nonbinding documents may serve a number of purposes. 
Perhaps the most important function of "soft" law is consciously to 
establish normative expectations-to be contrasted with binding 
obligations, which in principle are the realm of "hard" law. To that 
222 
extent, nonbinding instruments often function as ••good practice 
standards," phrased in terms of "shoulds" rather than obligatory 
"shalls." While not creating formal international legal obligations, 
these advisory instruments can nonetheless establish widely 
accepted standards for desirable or sound state practice. Adjectives 
typically applied to this category of instruments include ''hortatory," 
"precatory," and "aspirational." Recommendations of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and guidelines and principles adopted under the auspices of the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), along with the 
1972 Stockholm 4 and 1992 Rio Declarations,5 are perhaps the most 
familiar and influential. 
Because they often establish performance standards, these 
"normative" nonbinding instruments (or parts of instruments, for one 
document may serve a number of purposes) are among those with the 
greatest application to operational aspects of economic assistance 
programs. Especially to the extent that those instruments are 
specific from either a process or substantive point of view or both, 
nonbinding vehicles may find ready application in operational 
aspects of donor-financed projects and programs. For instance, the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Pesticides Code6 contains 
reasonably specific recommendations relating to testing, labelling, 
packaging, storing, and disposing of pesticides. Similarly, the 
nonbinding forest principles; adopted at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in 
June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro-the so-called "Earth Summit"-might 
well find application in projects, programs, and policies financed with 
development assistance. Such instruments are not confined to the 
environmental area. For instance, the World Health Organization's 
infant formula code8 has a similarly specific, operational focus 
amenable to application through programs of economic assistance. 
In this normative capacity, "soft" good practice standards may 
very well "mature" into binding obligations, of either customary or 
treaty origin or both. The most familiar example in the area of 
environment and natural resources is probably Principle 21 of the 
1972 Stockholm Declaration. Although originally framed as a 
nonbinding exhortation, over time Principle 21 has acquired the 
status of a substantive rule of customary international law, of which 
the originally precatory language is now evidence. Principle 21 was 
also codified verbatim in the operative portion of the 1992 UN 
Biodiversity Convention9 (a most curious interpolation as the 
Biodiversity Convention is intended to address in situ species 
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protection and not, at a fundamental level, transboundary pollution). 
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, another nonbinding instrument, 
somewhat modified the text of Stockholm Principle 21. This altered 
version then appeared in a subsequent multilateral agreement on 
desertification 10 (another unexpected importati~n because this 
agreement is not primarily concerned with transboundary pollution 
either). 
Multilateral nonbinding instruments may also be useful as 
collective statements of political will or purpose, and especially as 
precursors to concerted multilateral action on the international level. 
This is probably the best way to characterize the declarations from 
the annual meetings of the Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized 
countries. Often, such "political" instruments may precede the 
adoption of binding requirements in established treaty regimes. The 
treatment of sulfur emissions in Europe in the mid-1980s, 11 
adjustments and amendments to the Montreal Protocol in the early 
1990s, 12 and the recent amendment to the Basel Convention banning 
exports of hazardous wastes from developed to developing countries13 
provide good examples of the incremental, sequential purposes for 
which nonbinding instruments may be ·employed as precursors to 
binding legal obligations. Final acts of international gatherings, of 
which the best known is most likely the "Helsinki Final Act" 14 
resulting from a summit-level multilateral meeting in 1975, may 
perform similar functions. Although there is no hard and fast rule, 
those instruments, as discussed above, that are themselves intended 
to establish normative expectations are often negotiated over some 
time with a reasonably high level of attention to detail. By contrast, 
the "political" declarations, consistent with their more self-
consciously preliminary or preparatory functions, often result from 
a single international conference. 
Nonbinding instruments sometimes contain action plans for the 
future, in which case they consciously serve as "agenda-setting" 
vehicles. Although it also contains some normative elem en ts, Agenda 
21, 15 the 40-chapter action plan for the next century adopted at 
UNCED, is probably the most prominent example. The 1972 
Stockholm conference also produced an action plan including 109 
recommendations for future implementation at the national and 
international levels. 16 
The competing advantages and disadvantages of "soft" versus 
"hard" approaches invite a larger debate over what might be 
described as "choice of instrument." For example, nonbinding 
instruments can serve an educational function by allowing reluctant 
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or diffident states an opportunity to gain experience in a particular 
field in a low-stakes environment. To that extent, a "soft" instrument 
may be appropriate in situations in which a high degree of consensus 
cannot be obtained, in which speed is desirable, or in which 
widespread scientific agreement on the need for action is lacking. 
Consequently, the potential for overcoming inertial "least common 
denominator" results17 is often cited as one of the primary advantag-
es of the nonbinding, "soft" format. On the other hand, "soft" 
approaches are sometimes criticized as inappropriately relieving 
policy pressure for more aggressive action or attenuating already 
thin notions of law on the international level. 
Because of the innately aspirational character of nonbinding 
instruments that is rarely found in binding treaty obligations, "soft" 
instruments may very well provide an occasion for more expansive 
approaches to certain policy problems. For example, the Experts 
Group on Environmental Law of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development was charged not just with codifying 
existing legal principles, but also with giving "special attention to 
legal principles and rules which ought to be in place now or before the 
year 2000 to support environmental protection and sustainable 
development within and among all States."111 
It is important to recognize that there is no fixed trajectory in 
which binding instruments are necessarily less ambitious than 
counterpart "soft" documents, or vice versa. For instance, in the mid-
1980s UNEP adopted what in retrospect was a relatively modest set 
of guidelines and principles for the environmentally sound 
management of hazardous wastes. 19 The binding Basel Convention20 
followed in relatively short order. Due to a number of highly 
publicized cases in the intervening period involving the dumping of 
toxic wastes from the industrialized world in Third World 
countries-dubbed "toxic terrorism" and "garbage imperialism"-the 
binding convention contains considerably more stringent regulatory 
requirements than the precursor guidelines. 
Similarly, nonbindinginstruments are sometimes said to permit 
more flexibility in implementation than "hard" treaty obligations. 
There is, however, no inherent reason why that must be the case. 
UNEP's guidelines on international trade in pesticides and industrial 
chemicals, 21 for example, contain detailed procedural requirements 
of a much higher level of specificity than the obligations found in 
many environmental "framework" or ''umbrella" conventions. 
One may well question whether there is a distinction between 
"hard" and "soft" instruments, or whether that distinction, if it once 
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existed, continues to be either clear or relevant. According to one 
authoritative observer, moreover, 
[t]he very success of soft-law instruments in guiding the 
evolution of contemporary international environmental law 
has also produced a backlash effect: governments have 
become wary of attempts at formulating reciprocal principles 
even when couched in non-mandatory terms, well knowing 
that "soft" declarations or recommendations have a tendency 
to harden over time and to come back to haunt their 
authors. 22 
For instance, in the mid-1980s, the position of the United States with 
respect to many "soft" instruments was to treat them as de facto 
"hard." That is, the Executive Branch would not agree to a 
multilateral nonbinding document unless the U.S. was capable of, 
and prepared to, implement that instrument fully-an approach that 
arguably defeats the benefits of the "soft" approach not only for the 
United States, but for the international community generally. 
Nonbinding Instruments at The World Bank 
One of the World Bank's principal functions, as defined in IDA's 
charter, is "to promote economic development, increase productivity 
and thus raise standards of living in the less-developed areas of the 
world ... in particular by providing finance to meet their important 
developmental requirements." The IBRD, established in 1945, lends 
roughly at prevailing market rates of interest. IDA, created in 1965, 
lends to the very poorest countries in the form of concessional 
"credits," which carry very low interest rates or no interest 
whatsoever. Although a group of intergovernmental organizations 
constituted by their own organic treaties, the World Bank, through 
an agreement with that organization, has the status of a specialized 
agency of the United Nations. As of the end of 1995, the IBRD had 
179 member states and IDA had 158. In the fiscal year that ended in 
the middle of 1995, the IBRD and IDA together approved 242 loans 
and credits totalling $28.2 billion, many of which financed major 
development projects. 
The IBRD and IDA share common institutions within the Bank. 
One Governor, ordinarily that country's finance minister, represents 
each member state at the Bank. The Board of Governors meets as a 
body only once a year and in practice gives only very general 
guidance to the Ban.k's professional staff. Day-to-day authority is 
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exercised on behalf of the Governors by twenty-four Executive 
Directors, appointed or elected by member country governments, who 
have offices physically located in the World Bank headquarters 
complex in Washington and who, pursuant to the Articles of 
Agreement, approve staff proposals for individual loans. The United 
States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, China, Saudi 
Arabia, and Russia are represented by a single Executive Director 
each. Other Executive Directors represent groups of states. For 
instance, one Executive Director represents the Netherlands, 
Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Georgia, Israel, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine. 
The individual commonly identified as the Executive Director for 
Canada also represents most of the Caribbean countries. 
The Board of Executive Directors takes decisions by weighted 
majority voting. Votes are allocated according to a formula that 
depends on the number of a member state's shares and its capital 
contribution to the institution. So, among the current IBRD 
members, the United States now exercises somewhat less than 17 
percent of the total voting power in the IBRD, nearly three times as 
much as the next largest shareholder, Japan. No single shareholder 
holds enough votes unilaterally to direct the Bank as an institution 
to take a particular action, such as the approval or rejection of a 
particular lending proposal. 
The World Bank's professional staff, headed by the President of 
the Bank, is somewhat analogous to the secretariats of other 
international organizations. Bank staff work for the international 
institution of the World Bank and do not represent the interests of 
their own national governments. Bank staff are specifically charged 
with the operational task of preparing or "appraising" specific loan 
proposals for approval by the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. 
Internal Bank Policies and Loan Conditions 
Lending proposals must be agreed between the professional staff 
and the borrowing country government before presentation to the 
Board of Executive Directors for its subsequent approval. This 
consensual relationship between the Bank and the borrower is 
characterized by certain promises or "conditions" that the borrowing 
country government agrees to perform in return for the loan, 
including of course, but not limited to, repayment of the loan 
proceeds. The most important, but not necessarily all, conditions 
associated with a particular loan are memorialized in promises or 
"loan covenants" contained in the loan agreement. Loan agreements 
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between the Bank and borrowing countries have a status in 
international law similar to that of treaties 23 and are consequently 
enforceable by the Bank against the borrower. For example, if the 
borrowing country government were to fail to perform the loan 
conditions fully or satisfactorily, the Bank could suspend further 
disbursements, which are customarily made in phases or "tranches." 
The most complete description of the design of a proposed project 
or other loan, including the conditionality ·associated with it, is not 
contained in the loan agreement, but in a document known as the 
"staff appraisal report," which is prepared at an earlier phase in the 
project cycle before approval by the Bank's Board of Executive 
Directors. Management presents the appraisal report, together with 
the President's report and recommendation, to the Board of 
Executive Directors when that body is requested to approve a 
particular loan. A variety of internal Bank standards govern the 
substance and process of loan preparation and appraisal on such 
matters as prior evaluation of environmental impacts,24 involuntary 
resettlement, 25 treatment of indigenous peoples,26 natural habitats, z; 
water resources management,28 pesticide use, 29 forestry, 30 
international waterways, 31 and dam and reservoir projects.32 In 
general, however, the Bank's professional staff has a great deal of 
discretion in crafting the conditionality associated with a particular 
loan. 
Whereas the Bank's internal policies and procedures are 
technically enforceable, there are a number of institutional 
incentives and structural features within the Bank that have been 
identified as impeding full implementation of, and compliance with, 
these internal Bank policies or loan conditions or both. While such 
generalizations are necessarily based on informed anecdotal 
accounts, suggestions of some of these systemic impediments have 
found their way into the literature.33 The day-to-day dynamics within 
the institution, so the argument goes, tend to discourage both the 
inclusion of strict requirements in accordance with Bank policies as 
a condition of loan approval and stringent oversight of the 
implementation of loan conditions after Board approval and during 
implementation. An institutional imperative, reinforced by career 
incentives to professional staff, is said to encourage the Bank's 
management to "move" large amounts of capital out the door and into 
the hands of borrowing country governments. The imposition of 
conditionality may delay or impede this objective. These same 
staffers, who have often invested months or years in the development 
of a particular loan, are the same individuals that respond to 
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concerns from member country governments, citizens organizations 
in donor and borrowing countries, and members of the public both 
before and after loan approval. For this structural reason, there may 
also be an institutional impediment to rigorous implementation of, 
and compliance with, loan conditionality. As many as 30 to 40 
percent of Bank-financed projects are reported to be poorly 
implemented. 
In response to generalized concerns such as these and as a result 
of a specific case involving the creation of an ad hoc oversight 
mechanism, 34 in September 1993 the World Bank's Board of 
Executive Directors created an Inspection Panel35 that provides new 
opportunities for private parties to initiate proceedings to encourage 
compliance with and implementation of the Bank's internal 
standards. Most international organizations, such as the Bank, the 
UN, and the International Labour Organisation (ILO),. have 
administrative tribunals with limited jurisdiction to adjudicate 
disputes, primarily employee grievances, between officials of the 
organization and the organization itself. The Inspection Panel is the 
first time such external oversight has been applied to the 
implementation of its operational mandate by an intergovernmental 
organization. The Panel consists of three independent experts 
appointed in their personal capacities. Nongovernmental 
organizations may seek review of both failures by the Bank's 
professional staff to observe that institution's own internal standards 
and inadequate supervision by Bank staff of the implementation of 
loan covenants by borrowing country governments. Consequently, at 
least in principle, the Inspection Panel provides a vehicle for 
assuring implementation at two major junctures where Bank policy 
is made and implemented: (1) through review of the observance and 
implementation of the institution's internal policies by the Bank's 
professional staff in designing and appraising loans; and (2) through 
review of the implementation of borrowers' contractual obligations, 
which reflect the Bank's policies and procedures, in cases in which 
Bank staffs oversight of those obligations is alleged to be deficient. 
The resolution creating the Panel establishes some potentially 
significant limitations to its authority that are of particular interest 
in the instant context. The Panel, pursuant to the resoluti\ln creating 
it, is confined to considering "a failure of the Bank to follow its 
operational policies and procedures with respect to the design, 
appraisal and/or implementation of a project financed by the Bank." 
The Bank's "operational policies and procedures" referred to in the 
resolution creating the panel do not necessarily reflect even binding 
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customary norms in such areas as human rights, let alone the good 
practice standards contained in nonbinding multilateral 
instruments. There is also some question whether certain Bank 
policies, even those phrased in mandatory terms, are sufficiently 
binding, as opposed to hortatory, that they might be enforceable 
through the Inspection Panel process. 36 Moreover, according to 
anecdotal reports from the Bank's professional staff, conditionality 
contained in Bank documentation, such as a staff appraisal report, 
that does not appear either explicitly or by reference in the legal 
documentation, including covenants in the loan agreement, may not 
be amenable to oversight through the Inspection Panel process. 
The resolution establishing the Inspection Panel specified a 
scheduled review two years after the Panel began its work in 1994. 
During that review, some reports suggested that there was 
considerable potential for the powers of the Panel to be attenuated. 
In October 1996, the Bank's Board issued a statement clarifying the 
original Inspection Panel resolution and permanently extending the 
previously provisional status of the Panel without, however, altering 
the text of the instrument that created that body. 37 One of the 
principal issues in the review concerned the initial assessment 
undertaken by the Panel, previously limited to twenty-one days 
strictly for the purpose of ascertaining the standing or "eligibility" of 
the entity initiating the request for inspection. As a result of the 
Board's clarification, the first phase of a Panel investigation can now 
be extended up to eight weeks, and potentially indefinitely, to 
provide an opportunity for a more thorough inquiry "to establish 
whether the complaint is prima facie justified and warrants a full 
investigation because it is eligible under the [original Inspection 
Panel] Resolution." The Inspection Panel members themselves were 
reported to support broadening the range of entities eligible to 
initiate a request for inspection, while at least some Executive 
Directors wanted to contract the scope of eligibility; the result was 
a reaffirmation of the existing terms. The clarification also exhorts 
Bank management to engage in more extensive outreach efforts to 
inform the public of the existence of the Inspection Panel and its 
work. 
Based on the limited experience to date, the Panel has served as 
an important vehicle for highlighting gaps in the implementation of 
Bank policies in a public forum. In the three years since it 
commenced operation, the Inspection Panel has formally reviewed 
ten Bank-fmanced projects.38 The AsDB39 and the IDB"0 have also 
recently established analogues to the World Bank Inspection Panel. 
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It is important to recognize that these independent oversight 
mechanisms are but one channel, albeit an important one, for 
drawing attention to the need for full implementation of binding and 
nonbinding instruments. Both private parties and governments can 
also avail themselves of other mechanisms, such as direct 
communications with Bank staff, to encourage implementation or 
enforcement, even of those requirements that are not binding. 
A second, related issue concerns the terms of the policies 
themselves, which are currently under review. To streamline, 
simplify, systematize and clarify the application of the multiplicity 
of current Bank policies, management is replacing existing 
"Operational Directives" with "Operational Policies," "Bank 
Procedures," and "Good Practices."u In principle, the first two 
categories are binding and the third advisory, but the enforceable 
character of the instrument also depends on the phraseology 
employed in it. As a general matter, the new policies have been 
described as less comprehensive in scope, but more specific, in part 
to render enforcement and implementation through the Inspection 
Panel process somewhat more predictable. Some observers have 
questioned whether this conversion process is an opportunity for 
attenuating the mandatory character of these instruments, and 
therefore the potential for enforcement through the Inspection Panel 
process, by substituting policies of a precatory or hortatory character. 
As of this writing, about 80 percent of the Bank's generic policies 
have been "reformatted," although according to some, these are the 
less significant in operational terms. The other 20 percent, including 
those addressing resettlement, indigenous peoples, and 
environmental assessment, have been highly contentious; proposed 
changes that have been circulated or leaked have provoked 
vociferous objections, reportedly resulting in something of a 
stalemate. Because of this debate, indications from within the Bank 
suggest that there may be considerable utility to an objective 
comparison of the texts of the Bank's new policy instruments with 
the language of those that they replace to facilitate an objective 
conclusion. In any event, the related concepts of "mandatory' and 
"enforceablen would appear to be more useful in discussing this area 
of internal bank standards than is the term ''binding." 
Further research in this area is highly desirable, at a minimum 
to monitor developments on both these fronts. In particular, the 
relationship between these two areas-review of the Inspection 
Panel and revision of the Bank's operational policies and 
procedures-should be more closely scrutinized to determine the 
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connections, if any, between them and the significance of those 
relationships. For instance, this may very well be an example in 
which the creation of accountable compliance and implementation 
mechanisms discourages the adoption of mandatory, binding and 
enforceable standards by an internati9nal institution in the first 
place-a finding that would be quite significant for this project more 
generally. 
Nonbinding Instruments in Loan Preparation and 
Appraisal 
The preceding section addresses policies-e.g., Bank operational 
directives and loan conditionality-and mechanisms-e.g., the 
Inspection Panel-whose source is purely internal, within the Bank. 
In addition, both binding and nonbinding instruments that originate 
outside the Bank may well be relevant to the lending operations of 
the institution. 
According to its policies, the Bank "will not finance projects that 
contravene any international environmental agreement to which the 
member country concerned [i.e., borrowing country] is a party."42 
This requirement does not, however, address situations in which a 
borrowing country is not a party to a binding multilateral 
environmental agreement, even one of near-universal application. 
Although there appears to be nothing in writing to this effect, the 
author has heard senior Bank officials opine that the Bank will not 
ordinarily expect borrowing countries to adhere to the obligations of 
international agreements to which the borrower is not a party as a 
condition of an IBRD loan or an IDA credit. The Bank's General 
Counsel has stated in writing that obligations in multilateral 
agreements to which a borrowing country is not party cannot be 
enforced by the Inspection Panel.-13 That would appear to be a 
relatively straightforward conclusion, in that multilateral 
agreements to which a borrower is not party would not appear to be 
Bank "operational policies and procedures" as that term is used in 
the Inspection Panel resolution. Far more important is the question 
whether the obligations in multilateral agreements to which a 
borrower is not party should, might, or must be taken as a 
benchmark of "good practice standards" and thereby incorporated 
directly or by reference as loan conditionality in the Bank's 
operations. 
There are some precedents that strongly suggest that there is no 
legal impediment to such· a practice. The Global Environment 
Facility (GEF), a freestanding trust fund administered by the Bank 
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together with UNEP and UNDP, provides a telling example. As 
determined by the conferences of the parties to those instruments, 
those countries that are not party to the relevant agreement, such as 
the Biodiversity Convention or the UN Climate Convention, are 
ineligible as recipients for GEF projects in that area·H-the ultimate 
form of conditionality. While the GEF technically is a separate 
institution that operates pursuant to its own constitutive 
instruments, there appears to be nothing fundamentally different in 
the World Bank's institutional and legal structure that would 
preclude a similar posture or policy. Although the author has not 
been able to obtain any Bank documentation to this effect, Barber 
Conable, President of the Bank at the time of the adoption of the 
Basel Convention, is reported to have directed Bank staff to refrain 
from financing projects involving transboundary movements. of 
hazardous wastes. • 5 If anything, this is a situation in which the 
Bank's policy appears to be more stringent than the obligations 
contained in the relevant international instrument. There are 
indications that the environmental impact assessment standards of 
the Espoo Convention,• 6 a regional agreement applicable in Europe 
and North America and that is not in force even there, may be 
employed in other geographic areas. There are also suggestions that 
at least certain members of the Bank's professional staff view 
promoting wider ratification of multilateral environmental 
agreements as an element of the Bank's operational mandate. 
As far as binding international law of customary origin is 
concerned, the Bank's practice is even less clear. The Bank "will not 
finance projects that could significantly harm the environment of a 
neighboring country without the consent of that country."47 This 
requirement closely tracks a customary standard prohibiting 
transboundary pollution as found, for instance, in Principle 21 of the 
Stockholm Declaration. Otherwise, customary international legal 
standards do not appear to operate as a constraint on the Bank's 
operations, either as a matter of principle or of practice. Indeed, as 
discussed above, customary legal requirements that are more 
demanding than the Bank's operational policies and procedures 
cannot be taken into account by the Inspection Panel. On the other 
hand, the Bank's policy on international waterways is said to track 
customary norms in this area. 
The extent to which nonbinding instruments whose origin is 
external to the Bank play a role in the institution's operations is not 
entirely clear. For example, the Bank's pesticide guidelines reference 
a number of nonbinding instruments. The FAO Code of Conduct is 
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identified as containing "internationally accepted general standards 
on labeling, packaging, storage and disposal, and pesticide 
management." Some Bank staff informally suggest that nonbinding 
instruments with an operational character can perform a 
"legitimating" function for conditions incorporated in project design. 
In addition to the FAQ Code of Conduct, action plans associated with 
UNEP regional seas conventions, UNEP's London Guidelines 
addressing international trade in industrial chemicals and 
pesticides, and UNEP's Montreal guidelines on land-based sources 
of marine pollution48 have been mentioned in this regard. At the 
same time, there is very likely a considerable untapped potential for 
implementation of these "external" nonbinding instruments, and 
perhaps even some concern among Bank staff about potential legal 
constraints on incorporating the standards in these instruments into 
loan conditionality. 
As discussed above, the critical element of consent is 
fundamental to the relationship between the Bank and the borrower. 
Lending proposals must be agreed between the professional staff and 
the borrowing country government before presentation to the Board 
of Executive Directors for its subsequent approval. Bank staff may 
choose not to pursue negotiations on a loan proposal, or the 
borrowing country government may not be prepared to accept the 
conditionality considered by Bank staff to be appropriate for the 
circumstances. Negotiations between the borrowing country 
government and the Bank may break down, or the borrower may 
withdraw its request, on any number of other grounds. For any of 
these entirely legitimate reasons, a particular loan proposal may not 
reach the Board. Indeed, given the legal and institutional structure 
of the Bank, in which loan proposals must be approved by the Board 
of Executive Directors, a member country can hardly be said to have 
a legally identifiable right to a particular loan. 
As the Bank's General Counsel and others have pointed out on 
numerous occasions, the Bank's Articles of Agreement provide the 
Bank's borrowers certain assurances that loans will not be 
disapproved for inappropriate political, as opposed to economic, 
reasons. 49 That requirement, however, is a far cry from an 
entitlement to any particular loan and, accordingly, presents few if 
any impediments to the kinds of conditionality that can be, should 
be, and are utilized to assure sound project design. Moreover, as the 
Bank's acceptance of environmentally sustainable development as its 
core mission demonstrates, the operational distinction between 
"political" and "economic" is far from clear. 50 
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In recent years. the Bank's increasing tendency to include 
environmental conditionality as a component of its operational 
lending program has been the source of some friction with borrowing 
country governments. The Bank's borrowing countries have on 
occasion objected to environmental conditions in loan agreements not 
just as ill-judged exercise of Bank staffs considerable discretion or 
even as departures from the Bank's Articles of Agreement. Instead, 
so-called "green conditionality" has incorrectly been attacked as an 
outright violation of sovereignty that implies an infringement of the 
exclusive prerogative of borrowing states to govern within their 
territories. 51 
While these sentiments may very well create some reluctance as 
a policy matter upon the part of Bank staff to utilize instruments, 
whether binding or nonbinding, as a reference point for 
conditionality in particular loans, it is clear that there is no legal 
impediment to such a practice. As a legal matter, there is no 
distinction between environmental conditionality and any other 
technical specifications the Bank may choose to impose as a 
condition of a loan. If the borrower agrees to the terms on which the 
loan is offered, then the loan agreement with the Bank operates per 
se as a consensual derogation of sovereignty and is no different in 
this respect from any other international agreement. If, on the other 
hand, the borrower rejects the terms proposed by the Bank, there is 
no violation of international law because the borrower has no right 
to the loan in the first place and has voluntarily declined to enter 
into the agreement it in any event. 
This analysis strongly suggests that there is no legal 
impediment that prevents the Bank's professional staff from relying 
on good practice standards that originate outside the Bank as 
conditions of the institution's lending operations. Nonbinding 
standards such as the F AO Pesticide Code might well be employed 
for such a purpose. To that extent, the "good practice standards" 
contained in nonbinding instruments are no different from a legal 
point of view than the Bank's internal requirements. Indeed, as the 
GEF example makes clear, there is no doctrinal reason why even 
binding obligations contained in multilateral treaties to which the 
borrower is not a party cannot be adopted as loan conditions-of 
course, with the agreement of the borrower, as is true in every 
consummated loan agreement. To that extent, the principles 
contained in nonbinding instruments and the obligations in 
multilateral environmental agreements if anything have greater 
legitimacy as loan conditions, as they reflect generally accepted 
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international standards. The "operationalization" of such standards 
as mandatory requirements for Bank staff, as in the Bank's own 
internal policies, or as binding conditions, as in loan agreements, is 
consequently not only legal, but entirely appropriate. 
In the case of customary legal obligations, there is even quite a 
compelling argument to the contrary: As a public, multilateral, 
intergovernmental organization, the Bank is considerably more than 
just an agent of borrowing country governments. Instead, the Bank, 
whose membership is now nearly universal, is accountable to the 
international community as a whole and is consequently under an 
obligation not to act inconsistently with international law. In other 
words, the Bank's Articles of Agreement ought to be read in light of 
customary international law binding on the Bank's member states 
and the Bank itself as subjects of public international law. 52 In the 
case of a nonbinding instrument, this legal argument admittedly 
does not have the same force. It would nonetheless appear to be only 
natural, and certainly appropriate, to assume that widespread, 
generally accepted multilateral standards contained in nonbinding 
instruments would be presumed to apply in the Bank's lending 
operations. 
While difficult to document, it is probably fair to say that a 
majority of Bank staff have given little or no thought to this 
question, and the views of those who have may not be informed by a 
great deal of analytical rigor. This ''baseline" level or awareness 
ought to be investigated further. Moreover, so far as can be 
determined, there may be misconceptions about the extent to which 
legal principles constrain the implementation of nonbinding 
guidelines and principles as conditionality in the Bank's lending 
operations. Inquiries of representative members of the Bank's 
professional staff should clarify current attitudes. Through a 
dialogue with management at the Bank, this project might well 
contribute to reversing any misimpressions concerning applicable 
legal constraints, or the lack thereof, through an appropriate 
doctrinal analysis of the role of nonbinding instruments in a legal 
and institutional setting such as the Bank. 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
Further research should be undertaken with respect to all the 
institutions identified earlier in this chapter, not only to determine 
current practices and policies, but also to elevate awareness of the 
potential utilityofnonbindinginstrumentsfrom an operational point 
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of view. But notwithstanding what one would expect to be the 
relative maturity of this concern at the World Bank, there appears 
to be some uncertainty among the institution's professional staff as 
to how to engage with the structural, institutional, policy and legal 
issues presented by nonbinding instruments. Accordingly, focusing 
this research in the near term on the World Bank would appear to be 
highly desirable. 
The geographical location of the institution makes it readily 
accessible to American scholars. More importantly, within the 
universe of entities of interest in this area, a case study of the Bank 
is the most ripe. While other institutions have yet to adopt 
operational policies in many areas that overlap existing nonbinding 
norms, the World Bank already has considerable experience in 
implementation. Indeed, the organization is already engaged in a 
reevaluation of the policies themselves and one of the principal 
mechanisms for encouraging implementation and compliance, the 
Inspection Panel. The GEF, much of whose staff is housed at the 
Bank, is also likely to provide ready examples of alternative policies 
and practice to those employed in the Bank's mainstream portfolio. 
As the shape of the issue at the Bank becomes clearer, the research 
agenda might then expand to other institutions that present similar 
questions, such as UNDP. 
Some further desk research will be required. This chapter 
focuses on environment and natural resources, in part because it has 
been an area of great activity by the Bank. A similar analysis would 
also be appropriate in other areas, such as human rights. A 
systematic attempt to canvass and identify the universe of 
nonbinding norms would be a logical first step. Those instruments 
should then be compared to the Bank's own standards, bearing in 
mind the Bank's ongoing internal revisions. Some additional 
doctrinal work may also be necessary in light of subsequent findings 
in such a research agenda. 
The greater need, however, seems to be not for further book 
research, but for more empirical evidence to determine the "fit" 
between an appropriate analytical construct on the one hand and 
perceptions and practice at the Bank on the other. A systematic 
collection of anecdotal impressions and accounts from Bank staff 
could shed a great deal of light on the real-world issues of 
enforcement, compliance, and implementation. The relationship 
between the mandatory character of Bank policies and the 
availability of enforcement, implementation, and compliance 
mechanisms, discussed above, is a particularly promising area 
The application of non binding norms whose origin is external to 
the Bank-e.g., UNEP guidelines and principles-is a particularly 
difficult area to penetrate. Even at the World Bank, where one would 
expect discussion to be more advanced than at other institutions, 
there has been apparently meager thought, little practice, and 
virtually nothing reduced to writing. Two initial priorities would be 
(1) to determine the formal position, if any, of the Bank's Legal 
Department on this question; and (2) to survey the attitudes, 
perceptions, and practice of the Bank's professional staff more 
generally. On this question in particular, research is a particularly 
fertile occasion not only to observe existing policies and practices, but 
also to influence policy beneficially by engaging the institution in a 
dialogue that may very well highlight and enhance the potential 
utility of non binding instruments in realizing the Bank's operational 
m1ss1on. 
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